Introduction
Regionalisation and regional integration have been the subject of debate in political science and political economy regarding their impact on development for some time, but only recently have they gained sustained attention in mainstream economic analysis and development theory. This literature emphasises things like trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and regional production networks. Equally, in donor circles a number of agencies are quite engaged with these issues*/ indeed, there is growing acknowledgement that many problems in the areas of transport, disease, pollution, forestry, agriculture and the environment need to be tackled through regional and global forums. Yet, the globe's largest development organisation, the World Bank, has only very recently started to engage with the topic and only in a quite limited form. This is an interesting puzzle around an organisation that has over the past two decades*/ if not longer*/ prided itself in being in the forefront of the development debate.
The focus here is on both regionalisation and regionalism, where regionalism refers to formal institutional processes and regionalisation to the economic, social and political relations between nations and their impact on the development project in each country (Birdsall and Rojas-Suarez 2004: 2; Breslin and Higgott 2000; Kim 2004 ). There is clearly much grey between what constitutes regionalism and regionalisation. Nevertheless, it is a useful distinction. In looking at regionalism and regionalisation, no precise role for regions or regionalism in development is advocated, however, the proposition is that regional interactions do constitute an important factor in the political economy of any country's development and that they are ignored with peril. This reflects a broad critical political economy approach that questions the way traditional development projects and international financial institutions have institutionalised nation states as the site of 'development'. In this process, somewhat artificial barriers have been drawn between peoples and spaces which have framed and constrained both the development project and people's lives. Most academic literature focuses, in fact, on regionalism rather than regionalisation. That is to say that regional cooperation initiatives across the globe have produced a large and continually growing academic literature, more from political scientists and political economists than from economists (on South-East Asia see, inter alia, Beeson 2002 Beeson , 2004 Dent 2008; Frost 2008; Harvie et al. 2005; Jones and Smith 2006; Scollay 2005; Tran Van Hoa 2003) . However, since the 1990s, regionalisation, too, has been the subject of a growing political economy literature, prompted partly by the view that regionalisation and globalisation were operating in 'sometimes mutually reinforcing and at other times contradictory' ways (Kim 2004: 43) .
This article starts by exploring the World Bank's policy and practice in relation to regionalisation and regional integration globally and in South-East Asia, and by drawing out the underlying commitments that shape the policies and practices. What it finds is a notable silence on the topic, which is the product of a combination of institutional and ideological commitments. Institutionally, the Bank is the product of a state-centred discourse and it reproduces this discourse through its organisation and management, which are structured around lending to individual nation states. Ideologically, the domination of the post-Washington consensus (PWC) in the Bank reinforces the Bank's state-centric model of development*/ it promotes neo-liberal states, structured in ways that serve Western-dominated liberal capitalism. Further, the new institutional economics (NIE) analysis underpinning the PWC methodologically and philosophically largely ignores regional political economy.
NIE has been a major influence on the Bank's approach to development since the late 1990s (Broad 2006; Fine 2001; North 1998) . Indeed, it is the source of a large part of the so-called post-Washington consensus*/ which is how critical political economists have labelled the Bank's new development policy approach. The 'post' in this case, is an indicator of the degree of continuity with the neoliberal Washington consensus, marked, in particular, by the continuation of a conservative/neo-liberal approach to monetary and fiscal policy. The PWC does suggest that the Bank will pay greater attention to the specific situation of each borrower and this should manifest itself in better-developed socio-economic analysis of local conditions as well as consideration of global and regional political economy. In terms of the Bank's analytical output, it has published a lot of work in areas connected to the PWC: for example, on the topics of the social costs of adjustment and poverty, decentralisation as a policy prescription for increasing participation, ensuring local needs are met and improving governance, and the role of social capital in development. However, its lending practices have not matched the changes in its analytical output (Engel 2009 ). With regard to regionalism and regionalisation, neither the Bank's research output nor its lending program have kept pace with the broader interest in this topic.
The World Bank and regionalism
The World Bank has been a leader in the study and implementation of trends in development over the past two decades. It has promoted ideas such as social capital, local community participation, country ownership and pro-poor growth, and related initiatives include poverty reduction strategy papers and the knowledge bank. However, it has only had limited involvement in research and projects on regionalism and regionalisation. Prior to the mid 1990s, it was involved in a couple of regional projects and in 1996, it initiated a research project on regionalism and development, whose research output seems to have focused mostly on regional trade (Schiff and Winters 2003; World Bank 2005) . Interestingly, the research output did not generate a high level of publicity at a time when the Bank's publicity machine was in overdrive with the Bank under the presidency of James D. Wolfensohn. The Bank did start funding a number of regional (or multi-country) operations around this time. The review of these projects for the fiscal years 1995Á2005 from the Bank's Independent Evaluation Group, The Development Potential of Regional Programs, noted that the Bank provided US$1.7 billion in support for regional operations during this time (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2007: xvi)*/ this was less than 1 percent of its project and other funding overall for the period. Two-thirds of the expenditure was in the second half of the decade. Half of the funds went to Africa and around half of the projects 'focused on the environment and have been funded with grants from the Global Environment Facility' (ibid.).
The review came to a number of insightful conclusions regarding the Bank's limited engagement with regional projects and the nature and operations of the projects that did exist. It explained the lack of projects as the product of the Bank's structuring around country management units. The majority of Bank staff are located within the six regional units, but the regional units are largely an organisational mechanism*/ staff sit within country management units and it is these that organise and manage lending and operations. Country-based budgeting has dominated the Bank since its inception, and this acts as a major disincentive to
The international development institutions and regionalism 57 developing regional operations (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2007: xviii). Since 1997, there has been a major decentralisation of Bank lending staff from Washington, DC, to country offices, and this has only served to reinforce the country focus. While this may benefit country expertise, it has increased impediments to regional operations. Other disincentives identified by the review include the way that Bank grant funding is committed, a lack of involvement from country staff in regional programs, and that Bank procedures*/ especially in relation to risk management, monitoring and evaluation, contractual arrangements and financing of preparation costs for projects*/ are all centred around country operations and are difficult to utilise for regional programs (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2007: 45Á9).
These kinds of institutional impediments may also be a factor in the problems the review identified in the identification of regional projects and their integration with the Bank's key country planning documents*/ Country Assistance Strategies (CASs). The evaluation found that, overall, individual initiatives have been [r] elevant . . . But they do not derive from joint assessments with those countries of which issues would most benefit from regional approaches, nor are they closely linked to the Bank's country programs. Only a third of the 19 regional programs reviewed were included among the strategic objectives of the Bank Country Assistance Strategies of all participating countries (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2007: xvi).
On the lack of integration with CASs, the report later notes that:
there is a disconnect with Bank Country Assistance Strategies (CASs). The CASs do not reflect the regional strategic frameworks. Nor do they indicate how individual regional programs feature in country priorities. Only onequarter of all (262) CASs for countries involved in regional projects (under way in fiscal 1995Á2005) indicate that a regional approach is appropriate to the country's development agenda or mention the regional program in which the country is involved (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2007: 12Á3).
The report recommended that 'the Bank adopt a bigger role in support of regional programs' by incorporating regional strategies into CASs and developing administrative structures for supporting regional programs (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2007: xviii). The Bank management's response to the report was very circumspect, highlighting methodological flaws and noting the need for a 'measured approach' to regional operations (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2007: xxii) . This modest response and, indeed, the Bank's overall minimal involvement in regional initiatives is quite surprising given that the Bank has tended to position itself in the lead of new development directions and responses*/ a recent example being the Bank's push to have new global climate funds under its auspices. Further, the Bank has faced some competition from the regional development banks as all of them have 'recently issued strategies for fostering programs at the regional level, although they have not, with a few exceptions, provided substantial financial support for multicountry programs ' (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2007: 44) .
In the Bank's East Asia and Pacific regions, it 'has remarkably fewer regional programs' than in other Bank regions*/ it has only six (five partnerships and one project)*/ and the South Asia region does not have any projects (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2007: xxix, 6, 11) . Only one of the East Asia and Pacific initiatives is in South-East Asia*/ the Mekong River Commission. In contrast, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been quite active in regionalisation in South-East Asia. Of particular note is its Greater Mekong Subregion initiative, which started in 1992 and aims to increase economic cooperation with a particular focus on infrastructure linkages. From 1992 to 2008, it involved US$1.9 billion of loans from the ADB and co-financing of US$2.7 billion from other donors, plus around US$2.2 billion in funding from participating states (ADB 2008) .
The Bank's institutional structures based on state-based development operations do go a long way to explaining the lack of enthusiasm and engagement with regional initiatives. However, the proposition here is that the reasons go deeper than outlined in the Bank's evaluation. They are also a product of the Bank's approach to development and the theorising underpinning that, which the article now examines, before undertaking a case study of the Bank's approach to regionalisation in Vietnam in order to highlight further the reasons for and consequences of this approach.
The World Bank's understanding of regionalism and regionalisation derives largely from its mainstream economic analysis. The case for regionalism has been made from both neoclassical positions and its variant NIE, although overall neoclassical economics has not paid much attention to regionalisation because its unit of analysis is generally either firms, individual nation states or the globe as a whole. Through this focus, neoclassical economics privileges and naturalises domestic markets and nation states, and these interact*/ seemingly with no impact from geography or level of development*/ with the rest of the world. This framework was transferred to development economics when it started in the 1950s. As Berger so nicely put it, development economics in general has conflated capitalist development with national development and turned nation-states that flowed from complex and contested histories into unproblematic units to be developed and modernized, equating the governments of those nations with the nations themselves. This is directly linked to the way in which development economics and the idea of national development rested on an elitist and technocratic approach that conceived of development as a technical problem outside of history and politics (Berger 2004: 61Á2) .
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This lack of acknowledgement of geographic location also serves to hide neoclassicism's commitment to the existing structures of power and privilege that permeate the globe spatially and otherwise (this is a theme, in various ways, in Arrighi 1994; Brenner 2002; Harvey 2003) . Explicit regionally based political economic analysis could reveal structures of power and privilege and*/ as an organisation of these existing structures*/ it is not in the Bank's interests to reveal these. Neo-liberalism, which was dominant in the Bank from the early 1980s on, is even more suspicious of regionalism than neoclassicism for a range of reasons, the key ones being its general hostility to both state and supranational organisations and that regionalism could potentially divert attention from the all-important project of multilateral liberalisation. However, there has been a neo-liberal case made for regionalism on the basis that it can be 'used as a device for overcoming entrenched resistance to multilateral liberalization and for building coalitions favoring liberalization over wider areas ' (Frankel and Eichengreen 1995, quoted in Birdsall and Rojas-Suarez 2004: 23) .
Two recent Bank reports*/ The Development Potential of Regional Programs (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2007) and the World Development Report 2009: Reshaping Economic Geography (World Bank 2008)*/ make the case for Bank involvement in regional initiatives largely in NIE terms. NIE offers an expanded view of what constitutes market failures*/ problems of externalities, increasing returns to scale, monopolies, information failures and transaction costs. It also allows more space for regionalism. In particular, it gives a role to 'the development of regional public goods' to 'compensate for the failures of markets' (Birdsall and Rojas-Suarez 2004: 23) . It has been from NIE that much of the growing economics literature on regionalism has derived. The 2007 report focused on 'regional externalities'. It suggested that negative regional externalities can be addressed in cost-effective ways through regional structures. It also noted the possibilities to achieve economies of scale in the production of goods and services on a regional basis (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2007: 5). The analysis of why regional cooperation to address negative externalities does not occur relied on standard neoclassical economic arguments: the opportunity costs of regional programs, the free rider problem (here it uses relative gains as the deciding factor rather than absolute gains) and the issue of coordination (ibid.). The report's assessment of the relevance of regional programs came down to a need for a calculation of existence of externalities and efficiencies, and the 'alignment between country and regional priorities' (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2007: 6).
The World Development Report 2009 argued for concurrent regional and global integration in order that developing countries can gain from economies of scale, labour and capital mobility, and reductions in transport costs (World Bank 2008: 260) . It viewed 'regional integration as a mechanism to increase local supply capacity' and proposed differing strategies for developing countries dependent upon their proximity to large markets (World Bank 2008: 260Á1) . In other words, the focus is on economic regionalisation rather than on regionalism. Like most World Development Reports, it expressed some of the most progressive ideas around the Bank, in this case suggesting that countries far from world markets (Central Asia, Pacific Island states and sub-Saharan Africa) should aim for a model of integration that allows for cross-country compensation for those countries that suffer short-term losses from regional integration. It also championed support from the international community for developing social services and human capital in these remote locations (World Bank 2008: 261) .
On the one hand, the report*/ given its NIE influences*/ allowed for greater gains from regional cooperation and integration than in standard neoclassical analysis; on the other hand, neoclassical hostility to the state is not absent. So, for example, the report warns that when regional integration 'is institution driven, as in most developing neighborhoods today, political economy challenges can become major concerns' (World Bank 2008: 262) . Presumably, 'political economy challenges' is a rather opaque reference to the problems of government failure and corruption, for which the standard Bank prescription during the Washington consensus decades was reducing the role of the state. Under the PWC, the goal remains a minimalist state but 'political economy challenges' justify a range of new Bank interventions in recipient countries that aim to shape them as neo-liberal states supporting Western and US capitalism (Crawford 2006; Engel 2009; Porter and Craig 2004; Weber 2006 ). This framework also goes some way to explaining the preference for regionalisation over regionalism in the report, as the former is largely the realm of the private sector, and this justifies, too, the Bank's lack of action and programs around the issue.
What we see in these two reports, then, is a very narrow NIE analysis of regionalism and regionalisation that does little to broaden the Bank's approach to development. This, combined with institutional factors, is inhibiting a genuine engagement by the Bank with regionalism. Having said that, the Bank is not a monolith. It is a very large bureaucracy*/ with over 11,000 staff (Berkman 2008 : 16)*/ and it does operate in somewhat different ways in different locations. Studying Bank operations in different locations enhances understanding of the connection between the Bank's 'theory' and the 'practice' of its operations.
Vietnam and Asian integration
Vietnam is an interesting case study because in its transition to a more marketbased economy, it has achieved high rates of growth and high levels of poverty reduction. It has done this with high levels of donor support through much of the process. Indeed, it is probably not stretching the point to say that Vietnam has been a 'donor darling'. More to the point, though, donors have influenced Vietnam's development project. It is an interesting case study, too, because these changes have taken place as part of a dynamic and increasingly interconnected
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Vietnam was never as centrally planned or controlled as other socialist countries (Tønnesson 2000: 243) . Nevertheless, its economic performance pre-1986 was, for a range of reasons, quite poor (Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003: 51Á67). Dzung The Nguyen (2001: 166Á70) described Doi Moi as comprising three main periods. The first period, 'Path Seeking' (1986Á88), was driven by the informal activity occurring across the economy. It involved a series of microeconomic reforms that reduced the limits on private sector activity and domestic trade, followed by increases in official prices for non-essential consumer goods to bring them closer to market prices. Further, in 1988, land was reallocated in an equitable manner to households, which was central to significant improvements in farm productivity (Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003: 70) . These improvements were at the core of the dramatic reductions in poverty that took place over the next two decades (Masina 2006: 3, 17) .
Macroeconomic reform started in 1987 with the first currency devaluation, although the major devaluation was in 1989 and this brought the dong close to its market rate and produced positive interest rates (Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003: 70). The second phase of reform (1989Á93) was the key transition phase*/ reforms systematically moved Vietnam towards a market-type economy and macroeconomic stabilisation took place (Nguyen 2001: 167) . By 1993, growth was close to 10 percent and it remained at high levels until mid-decade (Joint Donor Report to the Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting 2003: 9). Dzung The Nguyen's third period of Doi Moi is 1994Á2001 and the focus was on consolidating reforms*/ tight fiscal and monetary policy was maintained and incremental reforms continued, including decentralisation of budget management, public sector management reform and ongoing integration with the global economy (Nguyen 2001: 168) . Since 2001, the government has largely continued the commitment to incremental reform, and economic growth has remained at 7Á8 percent per annum. Poverty declined from 37.4 percent of the population in 1998, to 28. Vietnam's economic growth and poverty reduction over these past two decades needs to be not just situated in the context of a fairly dynamic region but understood as part of the region. The links to the region operate in the areas of geography, climate, regional migration, trade, production chains, foreign direct investment (FDI) and formal governmental links and relations*/ exemplified by Vietnam joining the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 1995. In terms of Vietnam's closest neighbours, Cambodia has been growing at a high rate and, while the Lao People's Democratic Republic has not performed as well, the Mekong tourist route connecting the three countries has provided all three countries with a significant revenue stream and has produced close intergovernmental relations between tourism ministries. The ADB has invested a lot of effort into a Greater Mekong Subregion project, which has had a particular focus on transport corridors. Its NorthÁSouth Economic Corridor component, linking Bangkok, China's Yunnan Province and Haiphong in Vietnam, is seen as having a good deal of commercial potential (Frost 2008: 71) . Equally, though, Vietnam's land borders are associated with a range of problems that require regional policy responses: for example, people trafficking, upstream deforestation along the Mekong and its tributaries producing increasing flooding in the Delta, and crossborder pollution, particularly in the north around the Chinese border.
China's rapid growth has been a particularly strong influence on Vietnam, which is visible in the growth in trade between the two nations. Vietnamese exports to China have grown from just US$361 million in 1995 to US$3242 million in 2006, which made it the fourth largest destination for exports; in addition it was Vietnam's major source of imports (General Statistics Office of Vietnam 2008). Indeed, as The international development institutions and regionalism 63 region. Table 2 shows that six of Vietnam's top ten sources of FDI are from the region, and overall the region provides 67 percent of FDI (Nguyen and Nguyen 2007: 11) . These patterns of growing linkages in trade and FDI between East and South-East Asia are occurring across most of South-East Asia and have 'helped spur various regionalisation processes' (Dent 2008: 87) .
The World Bank and Vietnam
The World Bank has been the second largest provider of official development assistance (ODA) to Vietnam in most years since it re-engaged with Vietnam in 1993. Although Japan is usually the largest provider of ODA, the World Bank has a larger and more visible presence. This is because of the Bank's central donor coordination role, which increased after 1999 when Vietnam agreed to join the pilot Comprehensive Development Framework process and the associated Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper process. The Bank also chairs the Consultative Group for Vietnam (CGV). The Bank's role in the CGV gives it influence broadly over the geographical spread and sectors of donors' ODA. In addition to its lending program, the Bank has managed a number of trust funds for Vietnam and has encouraged joint funding of its loans: for example, under the 2004 structural adjustment loan, Poverty Reduction Support Credit III, the Bank lent US$100 million, and co-financing by other donors was US$73 million (World Bank 2004) . A 2001 study by Irene Nørlund confirmed that the Bank plays a lead role in pushing a 'development' agenda in Vietnam. However, the response from the Government of Vietnam and others to the role of the Bank has generally been Source: Nguyen and Nguyen (2007: 11) .
positive as it is seen as having a 'very open attitude in Vietnam' (Nørlund 2001: 9) . Further, the Bank has generally adopted a 'tolerant and longer-term view of the relationship' with Vietnam (Painter 2005: 273 (Nguyen 2001: 174) . Doi Moi was more than mere 'adjustment' of the economy, it 'revolutionised the entire set of development concepts and strategies' (Nørlund et al. 2003: 78) . The largest area of contention between the World Bank and Vietnam has been the pace and sequencing of reform*/ and despite pressure from the Bank, it is notable that Vietnam has been relatively successful in doing reform at its own pace. Overall, the Bank presents and analyses Vietnam's experience as a statebased neo-liberal development project and it attempts to deny the influence of socialism and the model of the East Asian 'developmental states' on Vietnam's development path (Masina 2006: 28) . Bank economists' analyses of Vietnam emphasise openness in terms of trade and FDI as key to Vietnam's development (Dollar 1996; Dollar and Kray 2004) The macroeconomic analysis in the CASs in both 2002 and 2007 includes virtually no analysis of the country's performance in the regional or global context, despite the focus in the era of the PWC on country specificity. In the 2002 CAS (World Bank 2002: 1Á2) , the Bank explained the decline in level of FDI to Vietnam both directly before and after the Asian financial crisis as the product of domestic problems, in particular too slow a pace in (neo-liberal) economic reform. This is important because, as Masina (2006: 75Á6) has demonstrated, in reality the only area that saw decline in FDI commitments was real estate (due to the bursting of the regional property bubble) and*/ outside this and oil and gas (which tends to yearly fluctuations)*/ FDI commitments were actually relatively stable. Further, the decline that did occur could be largely attributed 'to a parallel decrease in outward investment from those countries which had represented the dominant source of FDI to Vietnam', that is, from East Asia, from which 60 percent of Vietnamese FDI at the time was derived (Masina 2006: 79) . In other words, a regional political economy analysis sheds quite a new light on FDI changes. The view of the WTO as a site for Vietnam's development is obviously quite problematic given the failure to complete the Doha Round on trade liberalisation. In fact, this failure may be a blessing for developing nations as some analysis suggests that their losses from non-market agricultural access conditions would have been higher than likely projections of gains (Wise and Gallagher 2006) . Moreover, evidence suggests that small countries have not, in general, been very successful in pursuing their interests through the WTO given their limited resources and instead there has been a turn to bilateral and regional agreements, which has been particularly prevalent in Asia. Equally, it is the case that the current international trading system is not as friendly to South-East and East Asia as it was during the cold war era*/ a point agreed by both mainstream and critical analysts. Therefore, it is certainly worth pondering why the World Bank considered WTO accession was such a key to Vietnam's development project and there was no consideration of the potential benefits or dangers of regional agreements for Vietnam. It indicates that the Bank remains committed at a number of levels to a fairly unreconstructed version of neo-liberalism and the Washington consensus.
The extent to which the mainstream neo-liberal agenda has remained at the fore in the Bank is also visible in the CAS analysis of natural resources and environmental management, which begins by espousing land-titling and markets as the solution to environmental and developmental concerns (World Bank 2007: 10) . Despite a number of Vietnam's environmental problems having regional dimensions, there is no mention of them in the CAS in relation to either the environment or in the mitigation of natural disasters. The CAS does not refer to the Bank's one regional program that includes Vietnam*/ the Mekong River Commission project. The section on transport and infrastructure contains nothing on regional integration, nor any of the Bank's investment loans in these sectors in the period 2000Á4, despite the fact that Vietnam has been deeply involved in the ADB-sponsored Greater Mekong Subregion program. This has a strong emphasis on regional transport corridors that Vietnam has been actively involved in and, more to the point, these regional transport corridors do appear to have a notable potential to boost Vietnamese development (Frost 2008: 71) . These gaps are important because, as Pietro Masina pointed out:
An analysis of comparative advantages in East Asia and the reorganization of regional productive systems in a post-crisis environment would be very beneficial in helping Vietnam in planning medium-and long-term development strategies. But the 'common wisdom' based on neoclassical economics tends to confute the need for such planning, supporting the view that reforms would per se increase Vietnam's competitiveness. Thus, the international financial institutions, which would have the means for a large-scale investigation, remain silent in providing elements useful in understanding the dynamics characterizing economic restructuring in post-crisis East Asia (Masina 2006: 88) .
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that the World Bank's lack of engagement with regionalisation and regionalism is derived from both institutional constraints and ideological commitments. These are not, of course, unrelated. Indeed, they both can be traced back to the Bank's origins: its formation was the upshot of newly hegemonic America and its interest in organising the world system in a way that suited its interests. And its interests were a system of nation states open to penetration by Western capital and goods. So the Bank was, from the outset, structured to lend to supposedly sovereign states for projects. However, over the years, it has bent many of its institutional strictures: for example, its Articles of Agreement prioritise lending for specific projects but, since the mid 1980s, program lending or structural adjustment lending has accounted for at least 30 percent of Bank commitments on average. However, it is unwilling to bend its rules in order to promote regional development projects. The Bank's reticence to engage with either regionalism or regionalisation needs, then, to also be framed by its current development ideology, the post-Washington consensus. Regional development and cooperation could be a danger to the PWC's core ideas and commitments because it suggests a need for a more genuine engagement with the role of the state and interstate structures in promoting development and, at the end of the day, the PWC still promotes minimalist states, just ones better able to support liberal capitalist relations than the Washington consensus state showed itself capable of.
The very limited engagement with regionalism and regionalisation has been demonstrated, too, through the case study of Vietnam. In Vietnam's case, the lack of a regional political economy analysis prevents the Bank from developing a fuller understanding of Vietnam's development trajectory and from implementing regionally based responses to development issues in areas such as transport, disease, pollution, forestry, agriculture and the environment, which need to be tackled through regional and global forums. Given the often poor outcomes of development assistance and its limited availability, such silences and gaps in the World Bank's program should not be left unnoticed.
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